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Abstract
This paper develops a model of the banking market in which individual banks make
decisions concerning both the size and risk characteristics of their portfolios, and in
which actions of one bank spill over to aect actions of other banks. Various observed
banking market behaviors, such as herding, credit crunches, bank reaction to policy
changes, etc., are explained as optimal bank responses to idiosyncratic or systemic
shocks. Ó 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
At the beginning of the 1990s credit conditions tightened, leading some to
suggest that the US economy was being strangled by a credit crunch. This os-
tensible credit crunch led to a resurgence of academic and Federal Reserve in-
terest in banking market phenomena, as typified by the work of Bernanke and
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Lown (1991), Owens and Schreft (1992), Friedman (1991), Green and Oh
(1991), and Peek and Rosengren (1992). However, what many of these papers
lack is a theoretical model that explains either the forces in the economy capa-
ble of generating fluctuations in bank portfolio choice behavior, or which of
these forces can lead to a credit crunch.
In this paper I develop a model of the banking market in which bank man-
agers are assumed to dier in their tolerance of risk, and to choose the size and
risk characteristics of their investment portfolios optimally. Risk averse deposi-
tors allocate their funds among banks given their information about bank port-
folio risk. The banks take into account the eects on their own return to
lending and cost of borrowing of changing their portfolio size and risk, but ig-
nore their eects on other banks and the market. However, their actions spill
over to aect the actions of other banks.
I use the model to examine banks’ portfolio reallocations induced by id-
iosyncratic or systemic shocks to their local or global market fundamentals
or to their tolerance of risk. Specifically, in an asymmetric Nash equilibrium
a positive shock to an individual bank’s return to lending, such as hiring a
more skillful manager, will cause that bank to expand its lending and decrease
its portfolio risk; these changes in lending spill over onto the other banks and
cause them to expand their lending and decrease their portfolio risk as well. In
contrast, a positive shock to a bank’s cost of borrowing, as a result, for exam-
ple, of a competitor opening a new branch, has the opposite eect on the bank
and the market.
Systemic shocks to banks’ return to lending, such as an increase in com-
petition from non-bank lenders or an increase in non-risk-based capital ade-
quacy requirements, or costs of borrowing, such as an increase in
competition for depositor’s funds from non-bank banks or an increase in re-
serve requirements, have similar qualitative eects on the banking market.
Further, if a single bank’s tolerance for risk rises, then it increases both
the size and the riskiness of its portfolio. The spillover eect of this action
causes the other banks to increase the size but to decrease the risk of their
portfolios. This behavior is consistent with localized credit crunches or
booms. A systemic decrease in risk tolerance leads all banks to decrease port-
folio size and risk. Depending on the source of the shock, for example sun-
spots or regulatory change, banks’ optimal responses to the shock can lead
to herd-like behavior or a credit crunch. Finally, a falling risk free rate of
return leads to an expansion of credit accompanied by either an increase
or decrease in portfolio risk. These predictions of the model are consistent
with the stylized facts.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 the model is developed, and
in Section 3 the theoretical results are derived. Section 4 uses the findings
of the model to examine the recent ‘‘credit crunch’’ controversy. Section 5
concludes.
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2. The model
This model builds on the framework developed in Pecchenino (1992) and is a
generalization of the analysis in Mondschean and Pecchenino (1995). Assume
that there are two classes of agents: banks and depositors, and N types of banks,
i  1; . . . ;N , where type is a measure of managerial risk tolerance. The gross
risk free rate of return on lending is raL, where L measures aggregate loanable
funds, and r > 0 is a shift parameter. Thus an increase in L represents a shift in
the aggregate supply of loanable funds to the market, which will, in general, lead
to a decrease in all interest rates, so a0 < 0. Depositors are risk averse.
There is one source of bank failure in this model: portfolio risk. Portfolio
risk, indexed by r, is chosen optimally by banks given their tolerances of risk
and depositor behavior. Let pr be the probability that a bank holding a port-
folio of risk r fails, where pr 2 0; 1 for all r. Assume that the probability of
bank failure is increasing convex in bank risk: pr P 0 and prr P 0. This as-
sumption follows the basic portfolio theory set out by Sharpe (1970). In his
framework, expected returns increase with risk at a decreasing rate, so the
probability of insucient cash flows increases at an increasing rate. The p 
function is common knowledge.
The empirical findings of Keeton and Morris (1987) suggest that bank man-
agements dier in their preferences toward risk. I operationalize this dierence
as follows. Assume that a bank’s preference toward risk can be summarized in
a risk tolerance parameter, a parameter of its objective function. Specifically,
let ci be a type i bank’s risk tolerance parameter, where ci < cj; i < j; ci P 1,
for all banks of type i  1; . . . ;N : a type j bank has a greater tolerance for risk
than a type i bank, j > i, and banks can be ranked by their tolerance of risk.
The risk tolerance parameter enters a bank’s objective function in the following
way. Given a portfolio of risk r with probability of default pr, a type i bank
evaluates whether this risk of default is worth taking at pr=ci, while a type j
bank evaluates whether this risk of default is worth taking at pr=cj. Since
cj > ci, a type j bank tolerates more risk than a type i bank. While risk toler-
ance is a parameter, it is aected by, among other things, the local and global
regulatory environment, extraneous uncertainty, and/or animal spirits, since all
of these aect the actual or perceived benefit to risk-taking.
Two cases are examined. In Case 1 bank type, and thus bank portfolio risk,
is common knowledge. In Case 2 depositors cannot distinguish among banks
of dierent risk tolerances, but they know the distribution of risk tolerance,
and thus portfolio risk.
In Case 1, risk-averse depositors, given the common knowledge of bank risk
tolerances, allocate their funds among banks so that each dollar deposited in a
bank with portfolio risk r earns the market determined risk adjusted return for
bearing that level of risk. That is, the return per dollar deposited, d1, in a bank
with portfolio risk r, with value A^ per dollar of deposits if insolvent is
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1ÿ prd1  pr A^  qrraL
where raL is the gross risk free rate of return, defined above, and qr is the
market premium for the risk of investing in a bank with portfolio risk
r; q0 > 0; q00P 0; qr > 18r. Thus
d1r; L; r; A^  rqraL ÿ pr A^1ÿ pr ;
where, if aL > A^; d1r > 0; d1L < 0; d1rr > 0; d1rL < 0; d1r > 0; d1rL < 0, and
d1rr > 0. Assume A^  0.
In Case 2, to risk averse depositors all banks are, ex ante, observationally
equivalent. Assume depositors know the distribution of managerial risk prefer-
ences, and thus the distribution of portfolio risk. Then it is optimal for deposi-
tors to divide their funds equally among all banks and demand a return per
dollar invested, d2, that satisfiesZr
0^
1ÿ prid2  pri A^
h i
dr 
Zr
0
qriraL dr;
where portfolio risk is distributed on the support 0; r, all other functions are
as defined above. Then
d2~r; L; r; A^  rq~raL ÿ p~r A^1ÿ p~r ;
where ~r is mean portfolio risk, so q~r is the average risk premium and p~r is
the average probability of bankruptcy. Notice that the return per dollar invest-
ed in bank i does not depend on the riskiness of bank i’s portfolio. Then, if
aL > A^; d2ri  0 but d2~r > 0; d2L < 0; d2~r~r > 0; d2~rL < 0; d2r > 0; d2rL < 0, and
d2~rr > 0. Assume, as before, A^  0.
Banks, in both Cases 1 and 2, are assumed to be small relative to the market
so that they take the eects of their lending on market returns to be infinites-
imal. However, assume that portfolio returns, adjusted for risk, are declining in
aggregate lending, also measured by L  Rili, where li is bank i’s loanable
funds. Then, conditional on solvency, the market value of bank i’s asset port-
folio with risk ri, per dollar of deposits, is Airi; L; hAi , Ar > 0; Arr6 0;
AL < 0; ArL  0, where hAi is a shock to bank i’s asset value function; assume
AhA > 0; ArhA > 0. The asset portfolio production function is bank specific,
and can vary across banks as a result of dierences in individual bank manage-
ments’ skill at information gathering, etc. The shock to the asset function can
take on either an idiosyncratic or a systemic interpretation. If hAi 6 0 and
hAj  0 for all j 6 i, then the shock represents a change in the fundamentals
of the bank’s local market, other local markets’ fundamentals unchanged. If
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hAi  hAj for all i, j, then the shock represents a change in global market con-
ditions. 2
The market value of its liabilities per dollar of deposits (loanable funds, li)
are determined by both direct and indirect deposit costs. Then, in Case 1 the
market value of a type i bank’s liabilities per dollar of deposits is
D1iri; L; li; r; hDi   fd1ri; L; r; hDi   cli; L; hDi g where d1  is the interest
cost per dollar and c  is the cost of raising funds (attracting deposits), 3 where
cl > 0; cll > 0; cL < 0; h
D
i is a shock to bank i’s liabilities value function. This
shock can also take on either an idiosyncratic or a systemic interpretation. If
hDi 6 0 and hDj  0 for all j 6 i, then the shock represents a change in the fun-
damentals of the bank’s local market, other local markets’ fundamentals un-
changed. If hDi  hDj for all i, j, then the shock represents a change in global
market conditions. 4 Thus, D1r > 0; D
1
rr > 0; D
1
l > 0; D
1
ll > 0; D
1
rl  0;
D1L < 0; D
1
rL < 0; D
1
lL  0; D1r > 0; D1rr > 0; D1lr  0, and assume D1hD > 0;
D1
rhD
> 0, and D1
lhD
P 0.
The market value of a type i bank’s liabilities in Case 2 is D2i~r; L; li; r; hDi  
fd2~r; L; r; hDi   cli; L; hDi g where d2  is the interest cost per dollar of
deposits, all else is as defined above. Thus, D1ri  0 but D2~r > 0; D2~r~r > 0;
D2l > 0; D
2
ll > 0; D
2
~rl  0; D2L < 0; D2~rL < 0; D2lL  0; D1r > 0; D2~rr > 0; D2lr 
0, and assume D2
hD
> 0; D2
~rhD
> 0, and D2
lhD
P 0.
In both Cases 1 and 2 if a bank fails (the market value of its assets is less
than the market value of its liabilities) it is immediately closed (by statute).
Since a bank’s assets are assumed to be worthless in the event of failure, bank
depositors’ absorb the loss.
The type i bank, taking all other banks’ lending and portfolio risk decisions
as given, and considering itself small relative to the market, chooses ri, its port-
folio risk, and li, its portfolio size, to maximize
max 1ÿ pri
ci
 
Airi; L; hAi  ÿ Diri; L; li; r; hDi li; 1
where pri=ci is the probability of bankruptcy weighted by the bank’s risk tol-
erance. The first-order conditions are
2 For example, a large company opens (closes) a plant in bank i’s market. While this improves
local market conditions, it does not aect global conditions. However, if the economy goes into a
recession, global market fundamentals worsen.
3 These indirect costs could be the advertising costs required to attract new depositors, the cost of
opening a new branch to better serve existing customers, the cost of borrowing overnight funds to
meet short-term lending needs, etc. These costs fall when total available funds rise.
4 For example, bank j may enter bank i’s market thereby increasing local competition while
leaving global conditions unchanged. Or, substitutes for bank deposit accounts are introduced,
increasing competition among banks and non-banks in the global market, driving up deposit costs
for all banks.
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ÿ p
0
ci
Ai  ÿ Di   1ÿ p 
ci
 
Air ÿ Dir  0; 2
Ai  ÿ Di  ÿ Dill  0: 3
The second-order conditions are satisfied since
D 
det
ÿ p00ci Ai ÿ Di ÿ 2p
0
ci
Air ÿ Dir  1ÿ pci
h i
Airr ÿ Dirr p
0
ci
Dil
Air ÿ Dir ÿ2Dil ÿ Dilll
" #
> 0: 4
Eqs. (2) and (3) together define bank i’s reaction function. These first- and sec-
ond-order conditions hold for both Cases 1 and 2, where, in Case 2, Dr  0 and
Drr  0.
A Nash equilibrium is defined by the sequence of pairs
fri ; li ; rÿi; lÿig 8 i, where ri ; li  is the optimal response of bank i to all
other banks choices rÿi; lÿi.
3. Comparative static results
To derive the eects of idiosyncratic changes in one bank’s behavior on oth-
er banks, and of systemic shocks, I examine the case where there are only two
types of banks, which are assumed to dier in risk tolerances, and, potentially,
to have dierent portfolio choice options as well as dierent costs of funds. As-
sume there are k banks of type 1 and K  1ÿ k banks of type 2. Without loss of
generality assume k  1. In this case the equilibrium is defined by the simulta-
neous solution of the first-order conditions of the two types of banks’ maximi-
zation problems:
ÿ p
0
c1
A1  ÿ D1   1ÿ p 
c1
 
A1r1 ÿ D1r1   0; 5
A1  ÿ D1  ÿ D1l1l1  0; 6
ÿ p
0
c2
A2  ÿ D2   1ÿ p 
c2
 
A2r2 ÿ D2r2   0; 7
A2  ÿ D2  ÿ D2l2l2  0: 8
To determine the eect of changes in exogenous variables on banks portfolio
choice behavior, totally dierentiate Eqs. (5)–(8), taking account of the fact
that L  l1  Kl2. For Case 1 this yields
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where Gi  ÿ p00ci Ai ÿ Di ÿ 2p
0
ci
Air ÿ Dir  1ÿ pciAirr ÿ Dirr < 0; i  1; 2: In
Case 2 the right-hand side of the equation is the same, but the zero entries
in the left-hand side matrix are now non-zero, and equal (from top to bottom)
p0D1~r=c1, ÿD1~r, p0D2~r=c2, ÿD2~r, respectively.
Sucient for the determinant of the left-hand side matrix to be positive is
that
(i) AiL ÿ DiL > 0; i; j  1; 2;
(ii) ÿp
0
ci
AiL ÿ DiL ÿ 1ÿ pciDiriL < 0 i; j  1; 2;
(iii) A1L ÿ 2D1l1 ÿ D1L ÿ D1l1l1l1 < 0; KA2L ÿ D2L ÿ 2D2l2 ÿ D2l2l2l2 < 0;
(iv) A1L ÿ 2D1l1 ÿ D1L ÿ D1l1l1l1KA2L ÿ D2L ÿ 2D2l2 ÿ D2l2l2l2 ÿ KA1L ÿ D1LA2L ÿ D2L > 0;
(v) Dili small; i  1; 2
and, for Case 2
(vi) Di~r small; i  1; 2:
The conditions can be interpreted as follows. Under condition (i) an increase
in aggregate lending reduces the cost of funds faced by a bank more than it re-
duces the returns to lending. Under condition (ii) the indirect eect of an in-
crease in aggregate lending reduces the marginal value of the portfolio. This
increase in lending is equivalent to an increase in competition among banks
for the same lending opportunities, which enables borrowers to demand and
get better terms on their loans, given risk. Condition (iii) requires that the re-
turn to portfolio expansion be decreasing at the margin. Under condition (iv)
the direct eects of a change in portfolio size outweigh the indirect eects at the
margin. Finally, condition (v) requires that the marginal cost of expanding
lending not be too high, while condition (vi) requires that the marginal cost
of increasing aggregate portfolio risk be small. 5
Evaluating these derivatives under the above conditions, yields the following
results for both Cases 1 and 2.
5 An examination of the data on returns on other checkable deposits and 90-day Treasury bills
from the Division of Monetary Aairs of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
show that the last condition is consistent with stylized fact. First, the variance of the return on other
checkable deposits, measured monthly from March 1970 to November 1996, is only 17.5% of the
variance of 90-day Treasury bills over the same period, and the correlation between the interest rate
on 90-day Treasury bills and the interest rate spread between Treasury bills and other checkable
deposits is 0.91. Both these statistics suggest that interest rates on deposits vary very little over time,
and so very little in response to changes in average portfolio risk. Second, examination of the time
series of rates on other checkable deposits shows very little month to month variation over long
periods.
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Proposition 1. Assume
p0
ci
AihAi ÿ 1ÿ
p
ci
 
AirihAi > 0; i  1; 2:
Then a positive shock to bank 1’s and/or the K bank 2’s asset function(s) leads
both types of banks to expand lending and reduce portfolio risk.
A positive idiosyncratic shock to one bank’s asset value function, such as a
new more skillful loan ocer with the same risk tolerance being hired, causes
that lender to expand lending and reduce its risk exposure. The increase in local
lending increases aggregate lending, and through this channel lenders in other
localities with unchanged fundamentals will find it individually optimal both to
expand their lending, since the net return on their portfolios has increased at
the margin, and to reduce their risk exposure, since the return to risk-taking
has decreased at the margin. Thus, an improvement in one market spills over
onto the global market: a multiplier eect occurs. 6
A positive systemic shock to all banks asset value functions also causes an
expansion in lending and a reduction in portfolio risk. Examples of such sys-
temic shocks include increased competition from non-bank lenders, and a re-
duction in borrower creditworthiness as a result of a cyclical downturn. Both
negative shocks reduce banks’ returns at all levels of risk, and so lead to a con-
traction of credit and an increase in risk, since the return to risk-taking has in-
creased on the margin. A tightening of capital adequacy requirements that
reduced returns at each level of risk could also be an example of a systemic
shock in this framework. The higher capital adequacy requirement, counterin-
tuitively, would lead to higher bank risk as banks would take on greater risk to
maintain their portfolio returns. This suggests that capital adequacy require-
ments not linked to portfolio risk could have the opposite of the intended ef-
fect, as has been the case historically.
Proposition 2. Assume
ÿ p
0
ci
DihDi  1ÿ
p
ci
 
DirihDi < 0:
Then a positive shock to bank 1’s and/or to the K bank 2’s deposit value func-
tion(s) (the banks’ cost of deposits) leads both types of banks to contract lending
and increase portfolio risk.
6 The feature of the bank’s value (objective) function that is necessary for this spillover/multiplier
eect to be possible is that the marginal return to lending increases when other banks increase their
lending: there is a strategic complementarity (see Cooper and John, 1988). The banks’ objective
functions have this feature. Thus, when one bank chooses to lend more (less), for whatever reason,
all other banks find it in their interest to follow suit.
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A positive idiosyncratic shock to a bank’s deposit costs, such as those
caused by the opening of a branch by a competitor bank, causes it to seek far-
ther afield for deposits. This increases competition for deposits in other mar-
kets, driving up other banks’ costs as well. To maintain their portfolio, these
banks would have to raise funds outside their local market, but the increase
in costs induces a reduction in lending and an increase in risk to cover the high-
er costs. Worsening conditions in one market have negative systemic eects.
A positive systemic shock to banks’ deposit cost functions generates a reduc-
tion in lending and an increase in portfolio risk. For example, if competition
from non-bank banks for depositors’ funds increased, all banks would see their
cost of funds rise, and their access to funds fall. In response, banks would be
forced to invest in riskier assets to cover their costs, and at the same time re-
duce overall lending. A reduction in reserve requirements would have the op-
posite eect on bank behavior if the reserve requirements had been imposing a
binding constraint on bank lending prior to the regulatory change.
The first two propositions concern changes in local or global market funda-
mentals. The third concerns bank characteristics.
Proposition 3. An increase in bank 1’s (the K bank 2’s) risk tolerance(s) causes
bank 1 (the K bank 2s) to expand lending and increase portfolio risk, and the K
bank 2s (bank 1) to expand lending but decrease portfolio risk. If both types of
banks’ risk tolerances increase, then both will expand lending and increase
portfolio risk if own eects exceed cross eects.
When a bank becomes more tolerant of risk, it behaves profligately increas-
ing lending and lending to more risky ventures. Other banks are drawn into the
fray because the increase in aggregate lending increases their returns on the
margin, but their lending is directed to less risky borrowers because the same
increase in aggregate lending has reduced returns to risk-taking. This result
is consistent with the recent real estate booms in New England and on the West
Coast. While lending expanded nationwide, increased risk taking was concen-
trated in two local markets.
The conclusion that can be drawn from this proposition is that a systemic
shock to banks’ risk tolerances, for example because of animal spirits of the
Howitt and McAfee (1992) variety, or as a result of sunspots of Azariadis
(1981), or because of a regulatory change that aects the return to risk-taking
such as the Basel Accord, leads all banks to increase (decrease) portfolio risk
and size. Such behavior is consistent with a herd in which a bank’s portfolio
choice behavior is consistent with other banks’ portfolio choice behavior,
but is inconsistent with market fundamentals. This type of behavior is de-
scribed by Keynes (1936), examined by Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and Bane-
rjee (1992), and is consistent with the firm behavior suggested by the
management market signaling/reputation maintenance model of Rajan (1994).
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Monetary policy or a change in market fundamentals can, in the framework
of this model, be represented by a shift of the deposit supply function as a re-
sult of a reduction of the risk free rate of return. Banks see this as a reduction
in their cost of funds, at all levels of portfolio risk. Banks’ responses are sum-
marized in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. A decrease in the risk free rate of return causes both types of banks
to expand lending and either increase or decrease portfolio risk.
This result is consistent with Sharpe’s analysis of portfolio choice behavior
(Sharpe, 1970) since a reduction in the risk free rate lowers banks’ costs of
funds, which encourages lending, but more lending reduces the return to lend-
ing at a given level of risk. So, whether risk rises or falls depends on an indi-
vidual bank’s risk tolerance.
4. The recent credit crunch – An interpretation
Much of the examination of credit availability in the early 1990s has been
directed at determining whether a credit crunch occurred and if so was there
a policy response available to the Federal Reserve. A credit crunch is variously
defined (see Owens and Schreft, 1992, for a comparison of credit crunch defi-
nitions), but what is generally agreed is that the supply of lending falls, and this
reduction can be accomplished via a reduction in lending at all levels of risk
(Bernanke and Lown, 1991; Berger and Udell, 1994; Wojnilower, 1992) and/
or by a tightening of non-price loan terms at all levels of risk (Owens and
Schreft, 1992; Friedman, 1991; Berger and Udell, 1994; Wojnilower, 1992;
Cantor and Wenninger, 1993).
The model developed here suggests three potential sources of a credit
crunch: a negative idiosyncratic shock to a single bank’s asset value function
(Proposition 1), a negative systemic shock to all banks’ asset value functions
(Proposition 1), or a negative systemic shock to all banks’ tolerances of risk
(Proposition 3). The first two sources suggest that a credit crunch would be typ-
ified by a tightening of credit accompanied by an increase in portfolio risk,
which appears to be inconsistent with banks accomplishing the reduction of
credit via a tightening of non-price loan terms. The third source suggests that
a credit crunch would be typified by a tightening of credit accompanied by a
reduction in bank risk.
If a credit crunch is the result of a change in market fundamentals, as it
would be if it resulted from an idiosyncratic or systemic shock to the asset val-
ue function (Proposition 1), then the Federal Reserve’s policy response would
need also to act on asset market fundamentals. It is not immediately obvious
that such a policy option exists.
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If a credit crunch is the result of pervasive pessimism in the banking market,
or of extraneous uncertainty, then the Federal Reserve may have a greater role,
to the extent that it can aect banks’ perceptions of the market. Suppose, for
example, that banks’ market outlook depends, in part, on their perceptions of
examiner strictness. If all banks believe that examiners are going to be more
strict, then pessimism may pervade the market, leading to a credit crunch. This
result is, indirectly, consistent with Darin and Walter (1994). They examine
whether examiners were indeed too strict with the troubled banks in New En-
gland and in California in the early 1990s. They find that examiners were not
too strict. But, the quotes from the American Banker with which they open
their paper strongly suggest that banks did perceive, perhaps contrary to real-
ity, excessive strictness on the part of bank examiners.
Now suppose the relative returns on high risk assets are reduced via the im-
position of higher risk-based capital adequacy requirements. Holding constant
the asset composition of a portfolio, the regulations reduce a bank’s willingness
to take on this portfolio risk. Thus, all banks’ tolerances of risk fall, and all
banks reduce portfolio risk and size, all else equal. Thus, this change in pruden-
tial regulation could have the side eect of inducing a credit crunch. This result
is consistent with the findings of Peek and Rosengren (1995, 1992) for the New
England region in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Hancock et al. (1995), and is
partially consistent with the findings of Haubrich and Wachtel (1993) for the
entire US. Haubrich and Wachtel, however, found that while banks did reduce
their portfolio risk, they did not reduce their portfolio size, perhaps because
risk free rates were falling over the period of their study.
5. Conclusion
In this paper a simple model of the banking market is developed to analyze
the eects of sectoral and systemic shocks on individual bank and banking
market behavior. In this model all banks are linked via the aggregate quantity
of loanable funds. The eect of a shock to one bank’s cost of funds or return to
lending is not confined to that bank but spills over and aects other banks as
well. Sectoral shocks can thus have global repercussions, and global shocks are
intensified by the spillover eects. None of these results rely on depositors’ level
of knowledge concerning a banks’ riskiness.
Many banking market events can be explained within the context of this
simple model of bank behavior. Examples include: (i) the credit crunch of
the early 1990s which can be interpreted as a response to the Basel Accord since
the more stringent capital adequacy requirements simultaneously reduced all
banks’ tolerance of risk; (ii) the real estate lending booms in New England
and on the West Coast which can be seen as localized shocks to risk tolerance
in these two regions that spilled over onto the rest of the country; and (iii)
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banks’ response to competition from non-banks and the commercial paper
market which fits with systemic shocks either to banks asset and/or deposit val-
ue functions. But, since the model is static, it cannot explain the behavior of the
banking market as these events unfold. This remains a topic for future re-
search.
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